Concept and Position of Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: A Preliminary Study by Handayani, Irawati
HasanuddinLawReview 	
Volume 5 Issue 2, August 2019 P-ISSN:	2442-9880,	E-ISSN:	2442-9899	
Nationally	Accredited	Journal,	Decree	No.	32a/E/KPT/2017.	
This	work	is	available	at:	Microsoft	Academic	Search.	
 
 
235 
 
Concept and Position of Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in 
International Law: A Preliminary Study 
Irawati Handayani 
Faculty of Law, Padjadjaran University, Indonesia.  
E-mail: irawati@unpad.ac.id   
 
 
ARTICLE INFO 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Keywords: 
Jus Cogens; Peremptory 
Norms; Sources of 
International Law; Public 
Order 
  
How to cite: 
Handayani, I. (2019). 
“Concept and Position of 
Peremptory Norms (Jus 
Cogens) in International 
Law: A Preliminary Study,” 
Hasanuddin Law Review, 
5(2): 235-252 
 
DOI: 
10.20956/halrev.v5i2.1709  
 Peremptory norms or jus cogens hold a unique position in international 
law. Unlike customary international law and treaty law, they abide no 
derivation and bind all states regardless of their willingness to be 
bound. Some scholars had elaborated fundamental theories to answer 
the theoretical background of jus cogens. However, they have never 
reached a satisfactory result. This study aims to elaborate the theoretical 
background of jus cogens and to observe the relationship between jus 
cogens, obligation erga omnes, and customary international law. The 
positivists recognize that jus cogens is an imperative norm within state 
practice and opinio juris. The positivist theory is not in line with the 
concept that jus cogens bound to states without their consent since 
every state has their sovereignty and cannot be bound by any kind of 
provision without consent. The proponents of the natural law theory 
stated that peremptory norms are inherited from the tradition of natural 
law so that it is the highest norm in international law that directly binds 
countries. On the other hand, the public order theory states that 
international law recognizes important (imperative) norms, which are 
hierarchically higher than ordinary norms and customary international 
law to advance the interests of the international community and to 
preserve the main values of international law. The three theories are 
considered insufficient to answer the philosophical basis of jus cogens. 
In its development, therefore, some new theories have been developed to 
challenge the basis of jus cogens. 
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1.  Introduction  
Theoretically, jus cogens is considered as a problematic term in international law. The 
scope of jus cogens enumerated in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) 1969, regardless there is no clarity on the definition of jus cogens. The 
ability of jus cogens to override international treaties and to be “above” state consent with 
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the absence of clear definitions, indicates that jus cogens has an important position in 
international law. 
Article 53 VCLT 1969 provides that norms of jus cogens are norms that cannot be override 
by other norms. However, the Article 53 does not explain why do jus cogens have the 
highest status compared to other international legal norms. Alexander Orakhelasvili, 
states that each norm encompasses a substantive content and gain acceptance from states 
to identify whether the norm achieved the status of jus cogens.1 Abi Saab responded by 
argues that a jus cogens norm is observed from the consequences of the existence of the 
norm. Special criteria must provide a definition of material aspects that explain why do 
a jus cogens character that is inherent in a norm have a close relationship that cannot be 
ruled out.2 Furthermore, Orakhelasvili also provides a comparison that there is a term 
regional jus cogens, which has also been recognized by several international legal experts. 
The regional jus cogens is condition where a norm is considered to have highest and 
superior status and the states of the region recognize the norm as the norm of jus cogens. 
However, the existence of the regional jus cogens principle is certainly contrary to the 
application of Article 53 VCLT. The article explains that a jus cogens norm is a norm that 
must be accepted and recognized by the international community at large. 
International law does not provide a clear definition of jus cogens. However, 
international law scholars recognized that jus cogens is a norm with a special 
characteristics. Multiply analyses are required to categorize a norm as a jus cogens norm. 
One of the basic requirements to categorize a norm as a jus cogens norm is that if the 
norm has been adhered to and is recognized in international law. For example, in 
national legal system, government impose public order as a norm that must be obeyed 
by the society. This is an evidence and a condition that must be fulfilled since the norm 
has become a customary law. It is also a condition of a norm to be categorized as a norm 
of jus cogens.3 Wolff, explains that with the intention of states to implement, to obey, and 
to accept a norm as a legal obligation, the norm is considered as one of the customary 
laws. The acceptance of a norm that has been recognized by states is a condition where 
a norm can be classified as a superior norm and must be prioritized.4 
Vattel also expresses the importance of natural law that binding states without 
derogation. States are prevented from making any changes by agreement and there is no 
possibility of renunciation. Vattel says, 
It is by the application of this principle that a distinction can be made between lawful 
and unlawful treaties or convention and between customs which are innocent and 
reasonable and those which are unjust and deserving of condemnation.  
Things, which are just in themselves and permitted by the necessary Law of Nations, 
may form the subject of an agreement by Nations or may be given sacredness and force 
through force and custom. Indifferent affairs may be settled either by treaty, if Nations 
so please, or by the introduction of some suitable custom or usage. But all treaties and 
custom contrary to the dictates of the necessary law of nations are unlawful. 5 
Furthermore, Vattel also emphasizes the principle of lex specialis, which generally allows 
state to override or modify general principles of international law. However, this 
principle cannot be applied if the agreements established between states are contrary to 
                                               
1  Alexander Orakhelasvili. (2006). Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 43. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Ibid., p. 36. 
4  Wolff. (1993). The Law of Nations Treated according to a Scientific Method, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 10. 
5  Alexander Orakhelasvili, Op. Cit., p. 37. 
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the laws of the nations, which cannot be excluded. It is in line with Vattel’s view of the 
essence of peremptory norms in international relations emphasizes the question of 
whether natural law is the basis of the existence of peremptory norms. The fundamental 
argument for this question both at the levels of theory and practice is to uphold 
international jus cogens norms to prosecute war criminals in Nuremberg. The main norm 
at issue is not the existence of individual accountability, but the characters of war crimes 
and their trial without the need for states’ approval. 6 
 
2. Jus Cogens’ Theoretical Platform in International Law 
To find out the origin and evolution of jus cogens concept in international law theory, 
which has been existed in the 17th century until now, it is important to identify three 
main theories regarding jus cogens: positivist, natural law, and public order theory. There 
is an inaccurate understanding among international jurists who state that the term 
peremptory norm is only a result of the findings of the 21st century by not giving any 
precedent to the theory of international law. Classical international jurists, such as Hugo 
Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff illustrate that, in Roman law, there is a 
difference between jus dispositivum, voluntary law or binding law, based on the 
agreement of those who wish to bind themselves and jus scriptum (obligatory law) or 
binding law without the consent of the parties. Differentiation is needed to show 
agreement (consensus) among states on important principles of international law that 
directly binds all states without any agreement.7 This is of course different from the 
general obligation that comes from an international agreement or a customary, the norm 
jus scriptum does not allow derogations. Vattel states that this is because the norm 
originates from the highest source and natural law. 
We use the term necessary Law of Nations for that law which results from applying 
the natural law to Nations. It is necessary, because Nations are absolutely bound to 
observe it… This same law is called by Grotius and his followers the internal law of 
Nations, inasmuch as it is binding upon the conscience of nations… It is by the 
application of this principle that a distinction can be made between lawful and 
unlawful treaties or conventions and between customs which are innocent and 
reasonable and those which are unjust and deserving condemnation.8 
Even after the theory of natural law gained opposition from various parties during the 
19th century, one of which was due to the emergence of positive legal theory, the classical 
concept of peremptory norm remains influential for the theory of international law to 
modern times. International law experts in the early twentieth century such as 
Oppenheim and William Hall make it clear that state cannot override some principles of 
international law that have been recognized universally. In addition, at a practical level, 
judges at the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) ensure the existence of 
peremptory norms in international law by showing an international agreement that is 
contrary to the contra bonos mores (contrary to public order) in several decisions or 
dissenting opinions.9 Apparently, the PCIJ in this case shows an understanding that 
                                               
6  Belski et.al. (1989). “Implied Waiver under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory 
Norms of International Law”. California Law Review, 77 : 385-387.   
7  Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox Decent. (2009). “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”. The Yale Journal of International Law, 
34 : 334.  
8  Ibid. 
9  For example, in the case of Oscar Chinn in 1934, Judge Schucking in his influential dissenting opinion states that both 
in international courts and arbitration courts, there must not be a provision contrary to bomos mores (or could be 
interpreted as public order). Oscar Chinn Case, 1934, PCIJ. 
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there are a number of important or compelling norms (imperatives) that can override 
agreements made by the parties (states). 
Peremptory norm began to attract the attention of of international law scholars since the 
writing of Alfred von Verdross in 1937 entitled Forbidden Treaties International Law.10 
Verdross argues that there are several provisions in international customs that have been 
recognized as having “obligatory” or even compulsory characteristics whilst they are in 
fact not in accordance with agreements among states. At national level, in which court 
requires cancellation of contracts if they conflict with the public order, Verdross states 
that the court must override international agreements that are contrary to international 
norms of jus cogens (although, in his paper, he does not explain what is meant by the 
term jus cogens). Verdross defines peremptory law as “ethical minimum recognized by all 
states of the international community”.11 To illustrate the international jus cogens, Verdross 
states that a state is burdened with responsibility under international law to carry out 
some moral tasks, including maintaining public order and legal order, securing 
inhabitants from external attacks, safeguarding the welfare and security of its citizens 
and protect citizens who are abroad. Verdross also added that an agreement could be 
considered violating jus cogens if the agreement calls on the state to close schools or 
hospitals, to extradite and to sterilize women, to kill children or to take any action that 
causes citizens to be in danger. 
At first, Verdross’s view of international jus cogens raised skepticism. His idea against the 
common view of legal positivism developed by a famous legal experts (such as Hans 
Kelsen, Georg Schwarzenberger, and International Court Judge Gaetano Morelli). The 
experts state that a state cannot be bound to an international norm without its consent. 
They also questioned whether state practice shows a moral consensus that reaches the 
level of an international jus cogens. 12 In its development, resistance to jus cogens norms 
began to fade and, along with the end of World War II, the concept of jus cogens has 
gained recognition and credibility. The trials of World War II criminals in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo courts prove that international law provides substantive limits 
to the use of state sovereignty as a “shield” of state officials who committed crimes 
against humanity during World War II to be tried. At the same time, states gathered and 
agreed on the formation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and 
also establish international treaty, such as the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966 which aims to protect human dignity. Furthermore, the 
judges and international law experts unanimously agree on the existence of an 
international norm such as a ban on genocide that binds states without their consent.13 
The emergence of two sources of recognition on human rights norms, namely 
international conventions and peremptory norms, was concluded in the preparation of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in the meeting of the International 
Law Commission in the 1950s and 1960s. At the beginning of the VCLT compilation, 
supporters of the jus cogens norm received support from an international legal expert, 
the special rapporteur of International Law Commission (ILC), Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 
In March 1953, Lauterpacht included a draft convention on international agreements 
stating that “an agreement will be null and void if it is not valid under international law 
                                               
10 Alfred von Verdross. (1937). “Forbidden Treaties in International Law”. The American Journal of International Law, 31 
(4) : 571-577.  
11 Id., p. 574.  
12 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox Decent, Op. Cit., p. 336. 
13 See: Advisory Opinion of Internasional Court in Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, 1951. It states “the principle underlying the Genocide Convention are principles which are recognized by 
civilized nations as binding on states, even without any conventional obligations”.  
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and if it was declared invalid by the International Court of Justice”.14 Recognizing the 
uncertainty regarding the scope and content of jus cogens, Lauterpacht states that 
peremptory norms originate from two interrelated sources, namely international 
morality and general legal principles in the practices of states. In the view of Lauterpacht, 
a norm that overrides the principles of international law, such as the prohibition on 
slavery, can be categorized as an international public order. These principles can be 
referred to as a provision of international morality, which is powerful so that 
international courts regards these principles to represent a principle of international law 
recognized by the international community, where the International Court of Justice is 
bound to implement it based on the Statute of the International Court of Justice. By 
identifying jus cogens as public order and the principles of national law, Lauterpacht 
ideas is slightly the same with Verdross’s that an agreement would fail if it is contrary 
to international public order. 
Although there is widespread acceptance of the existence of jus cogens, still the 
International Law Commission has not received an agreement on the theoretical basis of 
peremptory norms or criteria that can be used to identify peremptory norms. Some 
members of the International Law Commission agree with Lauterpacht that peremptory 
norms represent minimal rules of international morality15 or are norms of public order. 
Furthermore, most members of the ILC join Sir Humphrey Waldock who was a special 
rapporteur for the United Nations for international treaties that sought to unite jus cogens 
with the conventional positivism paradigm. Based on Waldock’s formulation, the 
substance of peremptory norms in international law must be taken from traditional legal 
sources that reflect state consent, both originating from a custom or an agreement.16 
Finally, after going through many debates about jus cogens, in 1963, the ILC concluded 
that “there is not a widely accepted criterion that can define general provisions in 
international law that have the character of jus cogens”.17 
Article 53 states that “the norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of states that is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character“. This article 
recognizes jus cogens as an international norm that is non-derogable. However, it does 
not explicitly state that jus cogens originates from the principle of natural law, state 
consent, public order, and other theories regarding legal responsibility. Since this article 
does not identify international norms that are non-derogable, states are “free” to 
speculate on what can be categorized as the jus cogens norm. Nevertheless, there are 
clearly-stated examples that a provision is a norm of jus cogens, such as a commentary of 
Article 50 of the UN Charter related to the use of armed forces. The Article 50 is stated 
as “a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens”. Furthermore, VCLT recognizes the general concept of jus cogens without 
explicitly codifying the fundamental theories of peremptory norms in international law. 
 
2.1. Positivism theory 
Most contemporary observers continue to perceive jus cogens through the perspective of 
positivism that requires state consent. The requirement of state consent is justified on the 
                                               
14 Hersch Lauterpacht. Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur : U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63. 
15 See UN Doc. A/CN.4/156 stating “arguing that jus cogens norm must also be found necessary to international life and deeply 
rooted in international conscience”  
16 See the Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly [1966], UN Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 “a 
modification of a rule of jus cogens would today most probably be effected through a general multilateral treaty…)  
17 See Second Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/156.  
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basis that a state has the highest sovereignty; therefore, a state cannot be bound by a 
norm without prior approval. Based on an treaty-based approach, an international norm 
becomes a mandatory norm (peremptory norms) through the process of forming a law 
that produces international law. Specifically, states can express agreement with 
peremptory norms by codifying them in agreements and accepting them as international 
customary law and applying them as a general principle of law.18 
Proponents of the positivism theory recognize the “obligatory” nature of international 
customs that have obtained “mandatory” or compelling status through the practice of 
state and opinio juris.19 Restatement confirms this position by stating that jus cogens “is 
now widely accepted ... as a principle of customary international law”.20 For the positivist 
group, the jus cogens conception that is based on custom supports the legitimacy of 
international law by ensuring that states maintain good control of their generation and 
the evolutionary process of peremptory norms. If there is a strain to this group, they will 
argue by combining jus cogens theory, which is based on custom and state practices. 
States rarely express their intentions clearly to change an ordinary international 
customary norm into a peremptory norm. There is also no clear form of state practices 
(if any), which can support a conclusion of clearly stated intentions. In fact, many 
criticisms of Jus Cogens, especially that are related to human rights norms, such as the 
prohibition against torture that has been widely accepted as jus cogens, also in 
widespread practice, have also been violated. Even if state practices explicitly support 
peremptory norms that are recognized as international customary law, consent-based 
approach is difficult to explain why customary norms can bind on persistent objector or 
cancel an agreement that contradicts it. 
If jus cogens cannot be included in the category of international customary law, then the 
discourse that peremptory norms get their non-derogable status from an international 
agreement also makes little sense.21 The VCLT does not codify norms categorized as jus 
cogens in the convention, nor does it state that VCLT binds on states that do not ratify it 
except by consent. Other international conventions such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) have incorporated 
fundamental human rights norms into the convention and urged states to ratify them to 
provide effective protection for every human being. However, the states’ agreement to 
be bound by these conventions does not mean that a peremptory norm of international 
law has bound states that are not parties to the convention. The fact that many countries 
have ratified the Genocide Convention does not mean overriding the need for states that 
are not parties to the convention to express their consent to be bound by certain 
provisions of the convention. In fact, the statement that the Genocide Convention 
produced jus cogens through state consent has been broken by the convention itself, 
which states that the state party “confirms that genocide ... is a crime under international 
law” and contains a clause that allows the state to withdraw from the convention. 
However, it does not mean that the prohibition against genocide is not jus cogens or states 
                                               
18 Malcolm N. Shaw. (2008). International Law 6th Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (which states that 
only provisions derived from a custom or international agreement can be the basis of a jus cogens norm.)  
19 See Michael Byers. (1997). “Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules”. Nordic 
Journal of International Law, 66 : 211-212 (arguing that a jus cogens norm is derived from the process of customary 
international law). 
20 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of The United States 1987.   
21 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox Decent, Op. Cit., p. 340. 
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that there is no relationship between peremptory norms and international agreements.22 
What can be ascertained is that, in their practices, multilateral conventions that codify 
international norms are insufficient to identify these norms as mandatory (peremptory). 
 
2.2. Natural law theory 
One response to the shortcomings of the positivism theory of jus cogens is that 
peremptory norms are inherited from the tradition of natural law. Inspired by 
Lauterpacht who is anti-positivism, some experts argue that peremptory norms get 
privileged status from moral authority. For example, a member of the International Law 
Commission Mustafa Kamil Yeseen included in the VCLT formation process that the 
only possible criterion for distinguishing “ordinary” international customs from norms 
is to look at the substance of the provisions, including looking at whether these 
provisions are indeed rooted in international community.23 Later, human rights law 
experts such as Louis Henkin and Louis Sohn have proposed that jus cogens norms such 
as prohibitions on slavery and military aggression obtain peremptory status from moral 
and rational authority rather than through states agreement.24 As with international 
treaties, international customs, the general principles of international law can recognize 
and incorporate the norms of jus cogens but they cannot rule them out. The same 
recognition that jus cogens as a natural law is stipulated in the jurisprudence of the 
International Court25 and the Inter American Commission on Human Rights.26 
The conceptual challenges to the theory of natural law have been put forward. 
Proponents of positivism argue that the concept of natural law regarding jus cogens 
juxtaposes law and morality, thus confusing the boundaries and relations between 
ethical norms and objective principles of legal rights and obligations. 27  It is rather 
difficult for the natural law theory as the legal positivism theory seeks to explain how 
peremptory norms can provide substantive limits to actions taken by state without 
violating the principle of state sovereignty. On this basis, experts are starting to look at 
other theories that could explain the basis of the binding of jus cogens apart from the 
concepts of natural law and legal positivism. 
 
2.3. Public order theory 
The third tradition of international legal theory defines jus cogens as the norm of public 
order, which is important for the unity of international law as a legal system. Based on 
this theory, international law recognizes important (imperative) norms, which are 
hierarchically higher than ordinary norms and customary international law in order to 
advance the interests of the international community and to preserve the main values of 
international law so as not to be divided.28 Based on the theory of public order, all 
peremptory norms have two main functions, both functioning to maintain peace 
                                               
22 In the Advisory opinion “Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” 
1951, the court states a contrary that “ICJ has held that principles outlined in the Genocide Convention (as opposed to its 
specific provision) are “universal” and “binding on states, even without any conventional obligation”.  
23 Ibid., p. 342. 
24 Ibid., p. 343. 
25 Nicaragua case 1986.  
26 See the case of Domingues v. United States, report No. 62/ 
27 See A. Mark Weisburd. (1995). “The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens – as Illustrated by the war in Bosnia-
herzegovina”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 17. Stating that ‘natural law “risks falling into the error of assuming 
that, if it would be a good thing for subject of a legal system to refrain from particular behavior, it must make sense to 
render the behavior illegal” 
28 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox Decent, Op. Cit., p. 344. 
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between states as parts of the international community and to reward normative 
commitments to the main international system.29  
The theory of public order has stated that the violation of jus cogens is an act against the 
international community as a whole, this approach places peremptory norms adjacent 
to the provisions of erga omnes, which allows states that are not affected directly to react. 
The International Court of Justice explicitly states the concept of obligation erga omnes in 
the case of Barcelona Traction and emphasizes states to refrain from acts of aggression 
and genocide and to respect the principles and provisions regarding the fundamental 
rights of every human being, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination. The Court categorizes these norms as “the obligations of a state to the 
international community as a whole”.30 The statement from the court attempts  to frame 
peremptory norms as an obligation that must be fulfilled by the international 
community as a whole, while actually provides difficulties in conceptual matters. In 
what ways does the international community suffer losses when a country commits 
slavery or racial discrimination against its own citizens? The next question that arises is 
why the international community as a whole can sue for a violation that occurs in other 
states than those who live in the states. 
The theory of public order seeks to answer this dilemma by reiterating that peremptory 
norms are a principle element of normative and constitutive goals of international law 
from the international community as a whole.31 Myers McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and 
Michael Reisman argue that jus cogens norms such as the prohibition of acts of aggression 
and racial discrimination show the transformation of international law into a global 
community that respects human rights and peaceful relations among states. Supporters 
of this theory show evidence as contained in the Charter of the United Nations, which 
states the aim of the United Nations is to promote international peace and security, good 
relations among states, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 32 
Therefore, when the international community accepts the mission of the United Nations, 
the discourse that peremptory norms is an international policy is quite reasonable. 
 
3.  The Relationship between Jus Cogens and Fundamental Provisions in 
International Law 
3.1.  Obligation erga omnes 
Discussions often arise within the scope of international law regarding the concept of jus 
cogens and obligation erga omnes. Discourse emerged that these two concepts are identical 
or the same (two side of the same coin), but there are also those who argue that these 
two concepts are different. In general, the obligation erga omnes does not only cover all 
or part of the norms of Jus Cogens, but also regulates the status and boundaries of states, 
cities, islands, and regions that are internationalized, which can be easily modified by an 
agreement. Particularly with regard to its legal consequences, it is doubtful that all cases 
related to unilateral violations of jus cogens trigger responsibility for all states, or are only 
intended for widespread offenses.33 For those who argue that these two concepts are 
different, for example in the context of international criminal law, jus cogens is defined 
                                               
29 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Op. Cit, p. 131.  
30 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970.   
31 Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox Decent, Op. Cit., p. 345. 
32 The UN Charter, Article 1.  
33 Stefan Kadelbach. “The Fundamental Rules of International Legal Order-Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes” on 
Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.). (2006). Leiden:  Martinus Nijhoff, p. 26. 
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as a certain legal status that has been achieved by an international crime and the 
obligation erga omnes is defined as legal consequences arising from a particular crime 
that has been categorized as jus cogens. Therefore, these two concepts are considered as 
two different concepts.34 
The fundamental rules can be distinguished by looking at the legal consequences 
produced. Jus cogens specifically states that a provision that conflicts with it will be null 
and void (Article 53 and 64 of the VCLT 1969) and confirms the prohibition on 
reservations in terms of the agreement included in jus cogens. On the other hand, the 
obligation of erga omnes, so far, is considered included in the scope of states’ 
responsibility and interpreted as states’ obligation to the international community. The 
obligation to prevent states from being harmed by other states that violate the provisions 
of international law submitting claims against these violations is only because a state is 
a member of the international community and this violation has an effect on the 
international community as a whole. Meanwhile, the ILC has proposed a distinction 
between jus cogens and obligation erga omnes (norms that give obligations to states to the 
international community as a whole), and then propose that these two concepts are two 
different things.35 
The concept of obligation erga omnes falls within the scope of states’ responsibility. 
Unlike jus cogens, the obligation erga omnes is not explained in the VCLT 1969. This is due 
to the international provisions regarding states’ responsibility have not yet become an 
international convention that binds states. It is not easy to find criteria that explain what 
is meant by erga omnes responsibility. 
The International Court of Justice has several times referred to the erga omnes norms in 
deciding cases and described them as the “obligations towards the international community 
of states as a whole”. In the decision of the Barcelona Traction, “the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also [...] principles and rules concerning basic rights of human 
rights, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination” are mentioned as 
examples of obligation erga omnes.36 The decision of the cases of Namibia and East Timor 
are added to the list to be categorized as obligation erga omnes, the right to self-
determination.37 In the advisory opinion of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
this statement is reaffirmed. This opinion is aimed at certain obligations in international 
humanitarian law. This is stated by looking at the practice of jurisprudence, which is 
quite interesting as the legal opinion in the case of Nuclear Weapon. 
“a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’ … that they are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified 
the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles 
of international customary law … In the Court’s view, these rules incorporate 
obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes character.” 
In the legal opinion, this case contained the term “elementary consideration of 
humanity” inspired by the Martens Clause, which was used for the first time by the 
Court in the Corfu Channel case. It indirectly refers to the use of the jus cogens norm even 
                                               
34 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Op. Cit., p. 1.  
35 Ibid., p. 28. 
36 ICJ Reports 1970, p. 2, para. 33; with respect to genocide see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1996 (II), p. 616, para. 31; Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application) (supra, note 52), at para. 71.  
37 Namibia, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 15, para. 126; East Timor, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29.  
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though it was not mentioned explicitly. The above quotation implies that Article 1 of the 
common article38 of the 1949 Geneva Convention advocates and ensures respect for 
everyone in any condition. It indicates the erga omnes character of humanitarian law. As 
mentioned above, the argument is used as an evidence that some provisions in this 
convention can be categorized as the jus cogens norms. However, the court still insists on 
the “tradition” not to mention explicitly the term jus cogens. Therefore, this action opens 
up opportunities for any speculation that is a part of the norms of jus cogens and the 
norms of erga omnes. 
The Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (ILC) regarding state 
responsibility is not involved in considerations related to the main provisions and limits 
to only following the verdict of the Barcelona Traction case when answering what 
questions are examples of obligations to the international community. In articles on State 
Responsibility 2001, ILC did not use the term Erga Omnes, but found other concepts 
mentioned at a glance, namely: obligation vis-à-vis the international community, 
peremptory norms (jus cogens) and grave breaches of international law. 
 
3.2. Customary international law 
Some experts say that the norm jus cogens can be considered a “super customary law”. 
However, experts also distinguish between international customary law and jus cogens. 
The difference is, among other things, to be stated as international customary law must 
be fulfilled two main elements, namely the practice carried out widely and consistently 
among countries and opino juris necessitates, meaning that the practice has been 
considered a legal obligation and binding states. What needs to be underlined is that an 
international customary law that has fulfilled these elements binds states including ones 
that do not follow the beginning of the emergence of customary international law. Then 
it is observed that customary international law is universal. However, there is an 
exception, namely persistent objector, meaning that if a state has rejected existence or 
application of such customary international law consistently and repeatedly, the 
customary law does not bind the state. Unlike jus cogens, there is no persistent objector 
or, in other words, jus cogens norms apply to all states whether the state has objections 
or does not become an object of jus cogens.39 
Customary international law is the second source of international law contained in 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. To be more precisely, it 
mentions “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. The 
international court has strengthened international customs as a source of international 
law through several decisions. They are, among others, in the Nicaragua Case stating 
that there are two elements of an international customary law, namely objective elements 
(general practice) and subjective elements (have been accepted as law). Then, in Asylum 
Case: Columbia v. Peru (1950) The International Court of Justice describes habits as 
“constant and uniform usage, accepted as law”. Often, there are debates whether or not 
one condition is enough to be said as customary international law. There must be a level 
of repetition in a period. This is what the International Court of Justice uses as a 
reference. 40  However, it should also be considered that the court states this in the 
Asylum case context: “The facts … disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much 
                                               
38 Common article is a term which is used to state articles with a same provisions in the fourth Geneva Convention 1949.   
39 Dan Dubois. (2009). “The Authority of Peremptory Norms in International Law: State Consent or Natural Law?”. 
Nordic Journal of International Law, 78: 137.  
40 Peter Malanczuk. (1997). Akehurt’s Modern Introduction to International Law 7th revised edition. New York: Routledge. p. 
49. 
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fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and official views expressed on 
various occasions … that it is not possible to discern … any constant and uniform usage, accepted 
as law“. In this case, Victor Raul Haya de la Tore, the leader of a failed 1948 uprising in 
Peru received asylum at the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. Colombia and Peru filed 
a case with the International Court of Justice questioning whether Colombia has the right 
to give asylum or Victor Raul must be returned to the Peruvian government or allowed 
to leave Peru. In other words, this case cannot be categorized as an customary 
international law. It is not because there is no repetition, but because there is no 
consistency in practice. 
In the Asylum case, the court does not mention the level of uniformity of the practice 
that occurs and the precise period (duration) so that a condition can be declared to meet 
the criteria of “constant and uniform”. The Court also does not provide an indication of 
what evidence is needed so that repetitive and uniform actions can be categorized as 
customary international law.41 For example, there is the possibility of repeated practices 
such as respect for high-ranking officers in an armed force of a friendly state. This 
practice cannot be regarded as a rule of law and it is precisely categorized as respect. The 
most important thing is to determine the practice that occurs as an international 
customary law. In essence, to be categorized as an international customary law, an event 
should contain a duration of practice, acceptance and consistency of the practice, 
acceptance of the practice as law or the opini juris sive necessitatis and generality of the 
practice.42 
3.2.1.  Duration of the practice 
Based on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, it is seen that there is no 
duration or period needed from an event or condition to be declared as a customary 
international law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: FRG v. Denmark & FRG v. 
The Netherland (1969), the Court states that there is no duration or a clear period for an 
event to be declared an international custom. It needs only the practice to be carried out 
long enough to show that the preconditions of another custom have been fulfilled. 
“Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar 
to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was 
originally a purely conventional rule, an dispensable requirement would be that within 
the period in question, short though it might be, state practice, including that of states 
whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually 
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should moreover have occurred in 
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved”. 
3.2.2.  Uniformity and consistency of a practice 
The lack of clear consistency in practice will result in the formation of an customary 
international law. In the Asylum Case the court states: 
“The facts brought to the knowledge of the court disclose so much uncertainty and 
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum 
and in the official views expressed on different occasion; there has been so much 
inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some states 
and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by consideration of 
                                               
41 Alina Kaczorowska. (2002). Public International Law, London: Old Bailey Press. p. 15. 
42 Ibid, pp. 16-19. 
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political expediency in the various cases, that is not possible to discern in all this any 
constant and uniform usage, accepted as law…” 
However, uniformity is absolutely not needed and the lack of inconsistency will not 
result in the formation of customary international law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Case, the court states that the practice of state must be “extensive and virtually uniform”. 
Statements regarding consistency and uniformity were raised again in the case of 
Nicaragua, and the court states that there is no need for a state practice to be carried out 
purely and consistently to create an customary international law. By showing that 
generally the practice is consistent with the inconsistent provisions and actions is only 
considered as a minor violation of the prevailing practice, it is still considered that 
customary international law is valid. 
Nevertheless, there is something interesting here: although the International Court of 
Justice has always stressed the importance of the “constant and uniform usage” factor, 
in the case of Arrest Warrant (2002) the Court seems to create an “exception”. In this 
case, the Court states that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was immune from the 
jurisdiction of foreign court crimes on the grounds that the nature, function, and duties 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs required to obtain such immunity.43 This opinion is 
opposed by ad hoc Judge Van den Wyngaert who considers that the Court less than 
optimal in finding evidence that the practice is a “constant and uniform” practice.44 This 
Court decision is inappropriate and, therefore, must be limited only to this case and 
should not be used as a precedent to ignore material requirements in determining a 
practice to become a legally binding international practice.45 
 
3.2.3. Opinio juris sive necessitatis 
To be categorized as customary international law, the provision must be considered a 
binding law. Therefore, states must submit and comply with these provisions. This is 
what distinguishes customary international law from the norms of state relationship, 
which are based more on the habits carried out by states without any legal obligation, 
for example by paying respect to ships flagged by other state’s ships sailing on the sea. 
The main reason for the inclusion of this condition is to distinguish customary 
international law from habits that do not have the consequences of certain laws (usage). 
Furthermore, can opinio juris be assumed to be the general practice of states or does it 
really have to be explicitly proven? In the case of the North Sea Continental Shelf, the 
International Court of Justice stated that the opinio juris must be proven. 
“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a law requiring it. The need of such belief, ie the 
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of a opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The states concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not 
in itself enough. There are many international acts, eg in the field of ceremonial and 
protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by 
consideration or courtesy, convience or tradition and not by any sense of legal duty.” 
    
                                               
43 ICJ Rep. (2002), p. 3 
44 Dissenting Opinion Hakim ad hoc Van den Wyngaert dalam kasus Arrest Warrant . ICJ Rep. (2002), pp. 143-151. 
45 John Dugard. (2013). International Law: A South African Perspective 3rd edition. Kenwyn: Juta & Company Ltd. p. 33. 
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However, there were opinions from several judges who disagree with the terms of the 
opinio juris. Judge Sorenson agreed with Lauterpacht’s opinion that because of the 
difficulty in establishing an opinio juris, uniform implementation could be stated as 
customary law. On the other hand, Judge Tanaka states the contrary that the opinio juris 
can be observed from the need for these provisions in international law. In the case of 
Nicaragua, the majority of judges accept that in a case if there is customary international 
law together with international treaty law with the same problem, then the opinio juris 
can be concluded based on the actions of the parties to the agreement. However, this 
approach raises criticism because it compares two sources of obligation, namely an 
international agreement that binds because of the agreement of parties; conversely, 
international custom becomes law when state practice has been accepted as binding. In 
essence, the court emphasizes a state practice that is not merely considered an ordinary 
act but which is indeed considered a binding legal provision.46 
Problems that are related to fulfilment of opinio juris are mostly related to evidence: when 
and how to prove that a state has accepted a habit as legally binding. The burden of 
proof lies on state, which suggests the existence of a customary practice. Insufficient 
evidence  of opinio juris will result on the failure of determining a practice as customary 
international law. This was demonstrated, for example, in the case of Lotus (1927) 
between France and Turkey. In this case, France put forward several examples of actions 
that their ship crew had refrained from committing criminal acts. However, the Court 
rejected it, because France failed to prove that it was done consciously as a legal 
obligation. This is also stated in the case of the North Sea Continental Shelf. Although 
the principle of equidistance has been implemented in determining the continental shelf 
boundary for adjacent states, the Court is of the opinion that this is an insufficient 
evidence. Furthermore, the Court states as follow: 
“...that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to draw them in this way by 
reason of rule of customary law obliging them to do so –especially considering that 
they might have been motivated by other factors”.47 
The relation between the opinio juris and opinio necessitates in fulfilling psychological 
requirements of a practice to become customary international law needs further 
elaboration. Do the two elements have fulfilled altogether, or not? Opinio necessitatis 
means non-legal factors such as economy, social, and politics, which lead to a custom. 
An international custom emerged because of the demands of these factors. If the custom 
does not have objections or opposition from other states, it is even widely accepted and 
consciously accepted as a legal obligation. Then, the custom by itself has become opinio 
juris. In this stage, the attachment of states to these custom is no longer solely based on 
economic, social, and political considerations (opinio necessitatis), but has considered it a 
legal obligation (opino juris). 48  The correct example to be put forward includes the 
arrangement of the continental shelf. The regulation was initially encouraged, among 
others, by economic considerations attached to the continental shelf (opinio necessitatis), 
but then the states accepted it as a legal obligation (opinio juris). 
 
3.2.4. General State Practices 
Recognition of certain provisions as international law by most countries produces an 
assumption that these provisions have been generally accepted. These provisions bind 
                                               
46 Ibid, p. 18. 
47 ICJ Rep (1969), pp. 44-45. 
48 See Cassese, pp. 157-158 
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states in general and states can only reject the application of these provisions if it has 
expressed objections continuously to their application since it was first established 
(persistent objector). 
General application is not required to create a customary international law and the 
application of these provisions by a small number of states and the absence of practices 
that contradict these provisions adequately indicate the existence of a customary 
international law. Therefore, customary international law can be applied even if only for 
a number of states. As stated in the Asylum Case decision. 
“The Columbian government has finally invoked ‘American international law in 
general’ … it has relied on an alleged regional or local custom particular to Latin 
American States. The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other party. 
The Columbian government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance 
with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the states in question, and that this 
usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the state granting asylum and a duty 
incumbent on the territorial state. This follows from article 38 of the statute of the 
court, which refers to international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law”.  
With regard to the correlation between jus cogens, the concept of obligation erga omnes, 
and customary international law, several things should be underlined. As previously 
stated, jus cogens is a “compelling law” which is the highest legal source in international 
law. The term jus cogens is actually not included in Article 38 (1) of The Statute of the 
International Court, which is considered as a source of formal and material law. 
Although the article is not explicitly stated as a source of law, the court judges uses this 
article as a guideline in deciding cases. The term jus cogens or peremptory norm (both of 
these terms are often used interchangeably) can only be found in Article 53 of VCLT 
1969. Similar point happens to the term erga omnes, there is no clear definition of what is 
meant by this term. This concept mentioned for the first time in the case of Barcelona 
Traction in the International Court of Justice by stating that the legal obligation is 
intended as an obligation to the international community as a whole. However, the court 
does not elaborate on the legal regime of obligation. This concept has been developed 
from cases decided by the International Court of Justice but the content and the effects 
are still unclear. 
Although there is no clear definition of the two terms, there is a connection between jus 
cogens and the legal obligation in cases decided by the court. In the case of Barcelona 
Traction, the words used are “the international community as a whole”. It actually refers 
to Article 53 VCLT. Furthermore, the example given in the Barcelona Traction case is 
also an example used by the International Law Commission in the VCLT discussion. In 
the separate opinion, Judge Ammoun also mentioned about jus cogens and related it to 
the obligation erga omnes.49 It affirmed that the court has justified the jus cogens concept 
when introducing the concept of obligation erga omnes. Further, the court strengthened 
it in the case of East Timor (1995) and the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of 
the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2004). Even in the East Timor case, the court 
states that the obligation to protect the right to self-determination was an obligation erga 
omnes. However, the court refused the case for the reason that court has no jurisdiction.50 
                                               
49  Separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd 
(Belgium v. Spain), 5 February 1970, ICJ Rep. 1970.  
50 Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 June 1995, ICJ Rep. 1995.  
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In the case of the Wall of Palestine, the court stated that Israel had violated the right to 
self-determination of the Palestinian people as well as several obligations under 
international humanitarian law and this is included in the obligation erga omnes. 51 
Furthermore, to determine the obligations of other states if there is a violation of the 
obligations erga omnes, the Court implicitly applies Article 41 of the 2001 Articles on State 
Responsibility, which obliges states not to recognize any conditions that originate from 
violations of a peremptory norm, or provide assistance that can sustain the situation.52 
The relationship between jus cogens and obligation erga omnes is also recognized in cases 
decided beyond the International Court of Justice. In Furundzija’s case53, the ICTY states 
that the prohibition on torture was included in the obligation erga omnes and was a 
mandatory norm in the general principles of international law. The Kupreskic case states 
that the norms of international humanitarian law (including the prohibition against 
genocide) are the norm of jus cogens and the obligation erga omnes.54 Observing these two 
terms, it can be inferred that jus cogens deals with hierarchies of international norms and 
interests, while erga omnes obligations are related to enforcement with peremptory 
norms. In particular, violations of the jus cogens norm, which are very basic for the 
international community can provide legal interests for each country to be able to submit 
to these norms. As a result, if there is a violation of the norm, each country in the world, 
even if it does not directly affected by the violation, has an interest in protecting this 
norm and can take steps to enforce it. 
Furthermore, to discuss the relationship between jus cogens and customary international 
law, we can view several similarities. The Article 53 of VCLT reads 
“A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law. For the purpose of the present convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”. 
It is stated that the jus cogens norm is a norm that is accepted and recognized by the 
international community as a whole, while the customary international law must fulfil 
the material and subjective elements. The material element requires that the practice be 
carried out broadly and uniformly by states (extensive and virtually uniform), like in the 
case of the North Sea Continental Shelf (1969). The International Court of Justice states 
“…State practice, including that of State whose interests are specially affected, should…be both 
extensive and virtually uniform”.55 
Furthermore, the constant and uniform usage must be fulfilled as confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in the case of Asylum (1950) that a state practice can be 
recognized as law. What needs to be underlined is the consistent element, given that the 
frequency element is not enough because what is more important is consistency in 
carrying out the habit. Material required by Article 38 (1) of The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is a general practice or practice in general, not a practice 
                                               
51 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
para. 155-157. 
52 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
para. 159. 
53 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber II, 10 December 1998, para. 144 and  para. 151-
154 
54 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškic et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Trial Chamber II, 14 January 2000, para. 519-520 
55 ICJ Rep. (1969), p. 74. 
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that is universal or widespread. According to Brownlie, this general practice is a 
complementary factor to the element of consistency, especially when there are protests 
from some states regarding a practice that turns out differently. 
A psychological element that must be fulfilled is a habit, an opinio juris. States must 
recognize and accept that they are bound to carry out legal obligations arising from the 
custom (the opinio juris), or according to the sentence in Article 38, these habits (general 
practice) must be accepted as law. 
Some experts say that the norm jus cogens can be considered a “super customary law”. 
However, experts also distinguish customary international law and jus cogens. The 
difference is, among other things, a customary international law must fulfilled two main 
elements, namely the practice carried out widely and consistently among states and 
opinio juris necessitatis meaning that the practice has been considered a legal obligation 
and binding on states. What needs to be underlined is that a customary international law 
that has fulfilled these elements binds states, including those that do not follow the 
beginning of the emergence of international customary law. However, there is an 
exception, namely persistent objector, meaning that if a state has consistently and 
repeatedly rejected the existence or application of such customary international law, the 
customary law does not bind the state. Unlike jus cogens, there is no known persistent 
objector or, in other words, jus cogens norms apply to all states whether some states have 
objections or does not become an object of jus cogens.56 
Broadly speaking, it can be concluded that jus cogens norm is not the norm jus 
dispositivum, which can be ruled out by unilateral state actions, but it is a norm that has 
occupied the highest position in international law and has no exceptions in any form. 
 
4. Conclusion 
There are at least three theories in international law that can answer the theoretical 
foundation of jus cogens or peremptory norms. They are positivist, natural law, and 
public order theories. Positivist theory views jus cogens through the point of view of 
positivism, which states that a law requires state approval. The requirements of states’ 
agreement are justified on the basis that a state has the highest sovereignty. Therefore, a 
state cannot be bound by a norm without its prior approval. Specifically, states can 
express agreement with peremptory norms by codifying them in agreements and 
accepting them as customary international law and applying them as a general legal 
principle. The theory of natural law states that peremptory norm is inherited from the 
tradition of natural law. Some experts argue that peremptory norms get privileged status 
from moral authority. The last, public order theory, defines jus cogens as the norm of 
public order, which is important for the unity of international law as a legal system. 
Based on this theory, international law recognizes important (imperative) norms, which 
are hierarchically higher than ordinary norms and customary international law in order 
to advance the interests of the international community and preserve the main values of 
international law. Based on the public order theory, all peremptory norms have two 
main functions, both functioning to maintain peace between states, as parts of the 
international community, and to reward normative commitments to the main 
international system. 
                                               
56 Dan Dubois. (2009). “The Authority of Peremptory Norms in International Law: State Consent or Natural Law?”. 
Nordic Journal of International Law,  78 : 137.  
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The correlation of jus cogens, obligation erga omnes, and customary international law is 
that jus cogens relates to hierarchies of norms and international interests; while the 
obligation erga omnes is related to enforcement of peremptory norms. In particular, 
violations of jus cogens norm, which are very basic for the international community, can 
provide legal interests for each state to be able to submit to these norms. As a result, if 
there is a violation of the norm, each state in the world, even if it does not get a direct 
result of the violation, has an interest in protecting this norm and can undertake steps to 
enforce it. In addition, it is necessary for international law to establish clear criteria of jus 
cogens immediately, since the elements contained in Article 53 of the VCLT is insufficient 
to answer the criteria for an international norm to be considered as jus cogens or 
peremptory norms. In addition, clarification is needed for which institution in 
international law that hold the authority to determine the criteria for a norm of 
international law to be accepted as a peremptory norm. 
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